Article III and the Protocol limit launchers of submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and submarines equipped with modern ballistic missiles. The United States is allowed to reach a cap of 710 SLBM launchers out of 44 submarines from its base level of 656 SLBM launchers out of 41 ballistic missile submarines by replacing 54 older ICBM launchers. The Soviet Union could exceed the level of 740 SLBM launchers on modern nuclear submarines at 950. However, these additional launchers are only permitted as a replacement for older ICBM or SLBM launchers that need to be dismantled or destroyed according to agreed procedures. Given the many asymmetries in the strengths of both countries, the imposition of equivalent restrictions required quite complex and precise provisions. At the time of signing, the United States had 1,054 operational ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, none of which were under construction; The Soviet Union had about 1,618 operational and under construction. The launchers under construction could be completed. Neither side would start building other fixed ground-based ICBM launchers during the terms of the deal – which in fact also excludes the relocation of existing launchers. Launchers for light or older iCBMs cannot be converted to launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This prevents the Soviet Union from replacing older missiles with missiles such as the SS-9, which was the largest and most powerful missile in the Soviet inventory in 1972 and was of particular concern to the United States. Through diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, talks with Soviet representatives at the ENDC, and exchanges at the highest level of the two governments, the United States continued to push for a Soviet commitment to discuss strategic arms limits. But it was not until the following year that evidence of a Soviet reassessment of their position emerged.
On July 1, 1968, at the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Johnson announced that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to begin talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and ballistic missile defence. The date and venue of the talks had not yet been announced when the Soviet Union began its invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, an event that postponed the talks indefinitely. Negotiations began in November 1969 in Helsinki, Finland. [1] SALT I led to the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II led to an agreement in 1979, the U.S. Senate decided not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan that took place later that year. The Soviet legislature did not ratify it either. The agreement expired on 31 December 1985 and has not been renewed.
Both agreements were accompanied by a series of “agreed statements” adopted and initialled by the heads of delegation. When the two agreements were submitted to the US Congress, they were also accompanied by consensual agreements and unilateral declarations during the negotiations. These should clarify specific provisions of the agreements or parts of the negotiating protocol. The most important element of the summit concerned the SALT agreements. Discussions on SALT had been ongoing for about two and a half years, but with little progress. However, during the meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in May 1972, a monumental breakthrough was made. The SALT agreements signed on 27 May addressed two main issues. First, they limited to two the number of ABM (anti-ballistic missile) sites that each country could have.
(ABMs were missiles designed to destroy incoming missiles.) Secondly, the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles has been frozen at the current level. However, the agreements said nothing about several re-entry missiles that could be targeted independently (single missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads) or about the development of new weapons. Nevertheless, most Americans and Soviets hailed the SALT accords as huge successes. At the first meeting of the talks, from 17 November to 22 December, each side gained a better understanding of other views and the range of issues to be discussed. It was agreed that the talks would be private in order to promote free and open trade, paving the way for the main negotiations that opened in Vienna in April 1970. The meetings between Helsinki and Vienna then took place until the first agreements were concluded in May 1972. (When SALT II began in November 1972 to reduce the administrative burden associated with relocation, it was agreed to keep it in one place – Geneva – from then on.) The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two series of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the superpowers of the Cold War, on the issue of arms control. The two rounds of talks and agreements were SALT I and SALT II. Even after the Vladivostok Agreements, the two nations could not resolve the other two open issues of SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation`s arsenal.
The first was complicated by the Soviet bomber, which American negotiators thought could reach the United States, but which the Soviets did not want to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to restrict U.S. use of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). The verification also separated the two countries, but they eventually agreed on the use of national technical means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo reconnaissance satellites. On the 17th. In June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited the total number of nuclear forces of the two countries to 2,250 launchers and imposed a host of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including MIRVs. Intensive research has been undertaken to find ways to examine possible agreements without the need for access to the territory of the other party.
Both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement stipulate that compliance must be achieved by “national technical means of verification”. In addition, the agreements contain provisions that are important steps to strengthen security against violations: both parties undertake not to interfere with national technical means of verification. In addition, both countries undertake not to use deliberate obfuscation measures to obstruct the review. In August 1972, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly approved the deal. SALT-I, as it was called, served as the basis for all subsequent discussions on arms restrictions. The two agreements differ in duration and inclusiveness. The ABM Treaty “is of indefinite duration,” but each party has the right to withdraw with six months` notice if it decides that its highest interests are threatened by “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this contract.” The interim agreement was five years long and covered only some important aspects of strategic weapons.
The agreements are interdependent not only in their strategic implications, but also in their relationship to future negotiations on restrictions on strategic offensive weapons. An official statement by the United States underscored the critical importance it attaches to achieving broader restrictions on strategic offensive weapons. .